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NOTES AND COMMENTS
It is advocated that North Carolina should place a broader inter-
pretation on the word "accidental" so as to include any unexpected or
unusual occurrence. The court's statements in regard to the "accidental"
nature of the loss in the principal case may be regarded as dicta in future
cases since the outcome of the case rested on other considerations. It
is further believed that a preferable construction of the words "direct
and accidental" to "direct or accidental" would broaden the coverage
of the comprehensive clause so as to include losses covered by the same
clause in other states.
GEORGE J. RABIL.
Labor Law-Employer Refusals to Bargain Collectively
in the Southern Textile Industry
Since 1935, national labor policy has been to encourage the practice
and procedures of collective bargaining. The Taft-Hartley Act,1 though
otherwise curtailing union activities and the bargaining process, osten-
sibly added to2 the Wagner Act3 in respect to this stated policy. Section
8(b) (3) creates a new unfair labor practice for unions refusing to bar-
gain collectively. Section 8(a) (5) continues to make the employer's re-
fusal to bargain collectively with the union selected by his employees, an
unfair labor practice.4
Nevertheless it is still possible for a skillful employer to evade5 the
duty to bargain collectively, at least, temporarily. In Tower Hosiery
Mills, the North Carolina company
".... went through many of the motions of collective bargaining.
It met on numerous occasions with the union, conferred at length
regarding contract proposals, made concessions on minor issues,
and discussed and adjusted several grievances."
8
purpose of including all property damage to an automobile, other than mechan-
ical breakdown, exclusive of collision losses. It includes all of the older cover-
ages . .. and in addition many new losses never before contemplated by any
coverage whatever. It is a simple and convenient form of insurance. . . . It is
not a profitable coverage to the average insurer, as the hazards therein included
bring the loss rates above the premium level, but it does possess excellent sales
angles, and is simple of analysis and application." 5 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAW
AND PRAcTicE §3222 (1941).
161 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
'§§171 and 174.
3 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §151 et seq. (1946).
' The N.L.R.B. first determines whether the union in fact represents a majority
of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.
But outright refusals to bargain are not uncommon in Southern textiles.
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1442 (1948) enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d
504 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Postex Cotton Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 118Z948), rev'd on other
grounds, 181 F. 2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950); Highland Park Mfg-.-Co., 84 N.L.R.B.
744 (1949).
-81 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1949), enforcenent granted, 180 F. 2d 701 (4th Cir.
1950).
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But despite these "surface indicia of bargaining" during nineteen con-
ferences, held over a period of seven months, it was found that the
company's
". participation in discussions with the union was not intended
to lead to the consummation of an agreement with the union, but
merely to preserve the appearance of bargaining." 7
An examination of the general criteria used in determining "good faith"
bargaining may indicate how successful this evasion of the obligation
to bargain collectively has been in the Southern textile industry.
CHARACTERISTICS OF "GOOD FAITH"
Section 8(d) spells out the obvious requirements of negotiating-
meeting at reasonable times, conferring in good faith, and executing a
written contract on any agreement reached-standards previously set
up.8 In addition, two affirmative actions are proscribed by decisional
law. Unilateral action by an employer on a matter subject to collective
bargaining without prior consultation with the union, is a refusal to
bargain per se.9 Individual bargaining with employees, thus by-passing
and ignoring the union, is also banned.10
'Generally decisive in determining whether an employer refused to
bargain, is the question of "good faith." The phrases used by the
N.L.R.B. and courts in characterizing employer attitude during nego-
tiations, indicate how difficult of legal enforcement are the "good faith"
criteria. Is the employer's "mind hermetically sealed"' 1 against agree-
ment; does he engage in "Fabian tactics"12 or "shadow boxing" ;13 are
the conferences no more than "purposeless talk"'14 or "long and fruitless
negotiations" ?15 Such generalizations have delineated "bad faith." But
if the employer entered negotiations "with an open and fair mind, and
a sincere purpose,"'16 in a "spirit of amity and cooperation,"' 17 exhibited
' Tower Hosiery Mills, 81 N.L.R.B. 658, 662 (1949), enforcement granted, 180
F. 2d 701 (4th Cir. 1950).
'H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514, 523-526 (1941); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941);
Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91 (5th Cir. 1939); 13 N.L.R.B. ANN.
REP. 59 (1948).
SN.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 (1949); Aluminum
Ore Co. v. N.L.R.B., 131 F. 2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942).
10 N.L.R.B. v. Acme Air Appliance Co., 117 F. 2d 417 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Note,
27 N. C. L. REv. 266 (1949)." N.L.R.B. v. Griswold Mfg. Co., 106 F. 2d 713, 723 (3rd Cir. 1939).
12 Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 127 F. 2d 180, 185 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 652 (1942).
" Stonewall Cotton Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. 2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 667 (1942).
" Rapid Roller Co. v. N.L.R.B., 126 F. 2d 452, 459 (7th Cir.), ecrt. denied,
317 U. S. 650 (1942).
1" N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, 180 F. 2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1950).
16 Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
1' N.L.R.B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F. 2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U. S. 595 (1941).
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"fair dealings" in his "approach and attitude,"' 8 or made a "patient and
painstaking effort ... to reach agreement,"' 19 there has probably been
no refusal to bargain.
If such short-hand expressions leave a nebulous picture, the task of
dissecting the decisions to isolate individual factors in employer conduct
is even more uncertain. The holding in each case is based on the
employer's total course of conduct.2 0 Direct evidence of a purpose to
violate the statute is rarely obtainable.2 ' Basically, the issues are the
employer's intent, motive, or state of mind.2 The N.L.R.B. early noted
that "the indicia of good faith are notoriously elusive."' ' At best, the
tests for determining "good faith" cope with the extremes of conduct.
24
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SOUTHERN TEXTILES
It is said that collective bargaining is now accepted by employers as
here to stay.25 Unions today are supposedly so strong and powerful
that they dominate the bargaining process, thereby justifying restrictive
legislation.26 To what extent is this true in the Southern textile
industry?
The South today is the frontier of collective bargaining. The
region's major industry, cotton and rayon textiles, is among the least
organized of all manufacturing industries.27 Although collective bar-
gaining has been established at Erwin Mills, Marshall Field, Dan River
and portions of the Cone, Textron, Goodyear, American Enka and
Lowenstein chains, fully 80 per cent of Southern -textile workers are
unorganized,28 including employees of major companies. The AFL and
CIO Southern organizing campaigns, after four years, have substantially
11N.L.R.B. v. George P. Pilling & Son, Inc., 119 F. 2d 32, 37 (3rd Cir.
1941).
12 N.L.R.B. v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 179 F. 2d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1950).
2 N.L.R.B. v. Algoma Plywood Co., 121 F. 2d 602 (7th Cir. 1941); 14
NLRB ANN. REP. 75 (1949).
21 Hartsell Mills Co. v. N.L.R.B., 111 F. 2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1940).
22 N.L.R.B. v. Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills, 175 F. 2d 675 (5th Cir. 1949);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U. S.
595 (1941); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,
61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1947).
2, S. L. Allen & Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 714, 727 (1936).
2 See HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 239-261
(1945) (elaborate techniques used in negotiations).2 2
HILL AND HOOK, MANAGEMENT AT THE BARGAINING TABLE 15 (1945);
TAYLOR, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 220 and 228 (1948).
" MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT To TAFT-HARTLEY 271-281
(1950); Denham, The Taft-Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. REv. 168, 179 (1948);
Torff, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining: A Management Appraisal,
43 ILL. L. REV. 323, 347 (1948).
" Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Recognition, 1946, 64 MONTHLY
LAB. REv. 765, 766 (1947).
2 DEP' LABOR BULL. No. 885, UNION AGREEMENTS IN THE COrON TEXTILE
INDUSTRY 1 (1946) ; DeVyver, The Present Statifs of Labor Unions in the South
-1948, 16 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 13 (1949); PROCEEDINGS 5TH BIENNIAL CON-
VENTION TWUA-CIO 73 (1948); Fortune, Nov. 1946, p. 138, col. 1.
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failed to organize Southern textiles.2 Unions are often unable to
secure contracts years after certification8 For sometime now, non-
union mills have either matched or exceeded the economic gains won
through union action. This management initiative was recently drama-
tized by the unilateral announcement by large unorganized Southern
textile employers of an 8 per cent general wage increase.3 '
The Winston-Salem, Atlanta and New Orleans N.L.R.B. offices,
servicing the Southern textile area, are the only ones in the nation with
more unfair labor practice than representation cases.32  Compared to a
national average of 27 per cent "no-union" ballots of all votes cast in
representation elections, North Carolina records 57 per cent, Georgia
and Alabama 42 per cent, and South Carolina 41 per cent. 33 The textile
industry as a whole shows an abnormally high proportion of elections
won by "no-union": 42 per cent compared with 29 per cent for all
manufacturing industries.34  Significantly, elections where "no-union"
secures a majority vote, in Southern textiles, are often regarded as
company victories.35 This high "no-union" vote is not solely attributable
2 9
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 5TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION TWUA-CIO 39
(1948) ; DeVyver, The Present Status of Labor Unions in the South-1948, 16
SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 18-21 (1949); Textile Bulletin, July, 1950, p. 38, col. 1
(quoting TWUA-CIO as claiming less Southern membership than three years
earlier). Compare with original objectives: Amer. Federationist, June, 1946, p. 6
(one million members in next 12 months) ; Textile Labor, June, 1946, p. 1 (Can-
non, Bibb, Calloway and Avondale Mills as immediate goals); Textile Challenger,
August, 1946, p. 1.
"0 See N.L.R.B. v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 70 Sup. Ct. 826 (1950) ; N.L.R.B.
v. Union Mfg. Co., 179 F. 2d 511 (5th Cir. 1950); Hillsboro Cotton Mills, 80
N.L.R.B. 1107 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d 504 (5th Cir. 1950);
Itasca Cotton Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d
504 5th Cir. (1950). In all four cases, union was certified in 1944.
"' Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, Sept. 13, 1950, §2, p. 1, col. 4-6. Same
increase set pattern for organized mills. Durham (N. C.) Morning Herald, Oct.
16, 1950, §1, p. 1, col. 1; Winston-Salem (N. C.) Journal, Oct. 6, 1950, §1, p. 2,
col. 3; Raleigh (N. C.) News & Observer, Oct. 18, 1950, §1, p. 2, col. 4. Union
had not demanded wage increase prior to announcement. Textile Labor, Sept. 2,
1950, p. 1, col. 3; TWUA Contract Reporter, Erwin Chain Council, Sept. 12,
1950, p. 4.
11 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 163 (1949). Of all N.L.R.B. orders against unfair
labor practices, awaiting enforcement as of August 31, 1949, 32 per cent occurred
within the Fifth Circuit's jurisdiction. N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari,
N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (1949).
" 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 5 and 179 (1949).
" 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 173 (1949). North Carolina elections, involving
TWUA-CIO or UTW-AFL, held from October 1946 through July, 1950, elim-
inating known decertifications and elections where two or more unions were
involved, show "no-union" secured a majority in 18 out of 30 cases. Unions lost
elections in all units of over 1,500 employees. 3,201 "no-union" ballots of 4,615
valid votes were cast in North Carolina "textile" elections during 1950, through
July. From unpublished tables in preparation for M.A. thesis, by Robert Mil-
lard, Chapel Hill, N. C., based on records at Winston-Salem, N. C., N.L.R.B.
office.
" Cedartown Yarn Mills, 84 N.L.R.B. 1, 8 (1949) (paid holiday and parade);
Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525, 1550 (1948) (street demonstration, bon-
fire, dancing). See DeVyver, The Present Status of Labor Unions in the South-
1948, 16 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1, 16 (1949) ; Amer. Wool & Cotton Reporter, March
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to employer opposition. Other factors are: a working class with an
individualistic, rural background, still adjusting to industrial life; no
continuous or established trade union tradition; an almost exclusively
white working force, 6 community and press hostility; incorrect union
policies and strategy.3 7 Lost textile strikes in' the region are increas-
ing phenomena. Although company sales of housing facilities are in-
creasing,38 the mill village remains a strongly entrenched characteristic
of the industry, with all the implications of the "dominant landlord-
employer position. '3 9  State anti-union legislation, except for South
Carolina, blankets the South, much of it drastic, although no Southern
state has a labor relations act.
Employer opposition to unionization of Southern mills, by either
AFL, CIO or independent unions, presently includes both major pro-
ducers41 and small companies; Northern-controlled firms42 as well as
Southern independents; employers with existing collective bargaining
relationships in other industries43 and those having established dealings
23, 1950, p. 39, col. 1; Textile Bulletin, June, 1950, p. 32, col. 2; July, 1950, p. 38,
col. 2; Sept., 1950, pp. 40 and 51, col. 2.
" 14 ANN. REP. S. C. DE'T LABOR 67 (1949); LAHN, THE COTrON MILL
WORKER 81 (1944). TWUA-CIO has Jim Crow locals at Danville, Va., and
Leaksville, N. C. KENNEDY, A HISTORY OF THE TEXTILE WORKERS UNION OF
AMERICA, C.I.O. 294 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina
library, 1950). Compare with Southern industries where the racial employment
ratio is almost 50-50, and union organization widespread: Alabama coal, steel and
iron ore, North Carolina cigarette manufacturing; or industries with largely Negro
employment: cotton oil, tobacco leaf processing and fertilizer.
'7 Some weaknesses seem to be: a centralization of organizational structure
which smothers the development of Southern local leadership; the lack of any
program in regard to work-loads, the major employee grievance; almost no
women officials in an industry in which women comprise some 40 per cent of
the working force.
1" HERRING, PASSING OF THE MUM VILLAGE (1949) passim.
"Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 343 (1949). See 14 ANN. REP. S. C.
DEP'T LABOR 41 (1949) (State mill village population of 184,683).
"O Dodd, Trends in State Legislation Relating to Unions, NYU FIRST ANN.
CONF. ON LABOR 497, 499-502 (1948).
"1 See Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338 (1949); Burlington Mills Corp., 82
N.L.R.B. 751 (1949); Pacific Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 2 CCH LAB. LAW RE'.
10, 263 (1950); The American Thread Co., Inc.' 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949); Hart
Cotton Mills, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 26 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 1566
(1950) (Ely & Walker); Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949);
Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
Although the textile industry remains competitive, a distinct trend toward cor-
porate integration and monopoly is taking place. Markham, Intebration in the
Textile Industry, 28 HARv. Bus. REv. 74 (1950); Barkin, The Regional Sig-
nificance of the Integration Movement in the Southern Textile Industry, 15
SOUTHERN EcoN. J. 395 (1949).
" See N.L.R.B. v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U. S. 217 (1949); Pacific
Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3. 2 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 10, 263 (1950); Chicopee
Mfg. Corp. of Ga., 85 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1949); Premier Worsted Mills, 85 N.L.R.B.
985 (1949); The American Thread Co., Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 593 (1949).
"U. S. Rubber Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 3 (1949); Aldora Mills, 79 N.L.R.B. 1, 9
(1948).
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with textile unions in other mills. 44  The uniformity of the pattern of
employer opposition to unionization of Southern textile mills may be
attributable to the fact that most of the employer cases before N.L.R.B.
and courts are handled by only five law firms. 45  Employer techniques
have occasionally included: use of violence,
46 appeals to race prejudice, 47
and injunctions during strikes.
48
THE ROLE OF FIRST CONTRACTS
Such regional manifestations must be viewed as the background for
the problem of employer refusals to bargain in initial joint dealings. 49
The critical nature of first negotiations is well recognized. Collective
bargaining then has more to do with organizational questions than sub-
stantive matter. The union, insecure and recently established, is a
doubly sensitive "bride" in the "shot-gun wedding" with management.
The employer is faced with making a fundamental -change in thinking
and procedure. From individual bargaining-which usually means em-
ployees played no role, while the employer unilaterally fixes conditions 0
" Pacific Mills, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 2 CCH LAB. LAW REP. 110, 263 (1950);
Chicopee Mfg. Corp. of Ga., 85 N.L.R.B. 1439 (1949) ; Standard-Coosa-Thatcher
Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949); The American Thread Co., Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 593
(1949).
' Located in Greensboro and Charlotte, North Carolina; Atlanta and Decatur,
Georgia; and Fort Worth, Texas.
' Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1146-1153 (1949) (employer
procured pistol permits, armed some 75 or 100 persons for attack upon picket
line with resultant beatings and violence); Dixie Mercerizing Co., 86 N.L.R.B.
285, 294-297 (1949) (with plant whistle as signal, mob of 50 or 60 persons pre-
vented distribution of union handbills, seized same and forced organizers to leave;
employer held responsible); Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1949)
passim (murder threats, planned provocation and physical assaults by employer
agents) ; Macon Textiles, Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525, 1548-1549 (1948) (employer
responsible for attempt to run union men down by driving car up on sidewalk,
physical assault and attempted provocation).
,7 Bibb Mfg. Co., 82 N.L.R.B. 338, 339-341 and 355-362 (1949); Russell Mfg.
Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1107 and 1110 (1949); Macon Textiles, Inc., 80
N.L.R.B. 1525, 1547 (1948); Magnolia Cotton Mill Co., Inc., 79 N.L.R.B. 91,
113 (1948). See Textile Bulletin, June, 1950, p. 31, col. 2; Sept., 1950, p. 42,
col. 2; Fortune, Nov., 1946. p. 230, col. 2.
," See Hart Cotton Mill, Inc. v. Abrams, 231 N. C. 431, 57 S. E. 2d 803
(1950) ; Aired v. Celanese Corp., 205 Ga. 371, 54 S. E. 2d 240 (1949), cer. de-
nied, 338 U. S. 937 (1950); Safie Mfg. Co. v. Arnold, 228 N. C. 375, 45 S. E.
2d 577 (1947); Corley v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 201 Ga. 333, 39 S. E. 2d 861
(1946); ExEcuTrIVE COUNCIL REPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION, TWUA-CIO
30 (1950).
"114 NLRB ANN. REP. 159 (1949) (26 per cent of all unfair labor practice
cases against employers involve refusals to bargain). During this period, fiscal
1949, 23 per cent of all cases filed involving 8(a) (5) allegations, arose in the
13 Southern states (Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee and Texas con-
tributed 14 per cent of the national total). Twenty per cent of all 8(a) (5)
charges filed during fiscal 1948-1950 were Southern cases. From statistical chart
prepared for writer by N.L.R.B., October 20, 1950. See MILLIS AND BROWN,
FRom THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 121, 127, 293 and 448 (1950); Textile
Labor, July 22, 1950, p. 11, col. 4.
" See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 397 (1898); N.L.R.B. v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1, 33 (1937).
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-the step is to collective bargaining,51 with its majority rule principle 52
and the sharing of certain managerial functions with union represent-
atives.
53
The crux of the statutory protection of employee rights is in Section
8(a) (5), whereby they are enabled through collective bargaining to
secure the fruits of self-organization such as grievance procedure and
seniority rights.s4 Recognition and negotiation are not ends in them-
selves but the means of securing these written, industrial constitutions.55
Collective bargaining is now so generally accepted elsewhere, that the
present 'debate centers on the scope of its subject matter ;56 in the South,
however, attention must still be focused on the initial step in the estab-
lishment of the collective bargaining process.
CONCLUSIONS
If national labor policy is to work out a peaceful solution5 7 in the
South, the N.L.R.B. and courts might consider four possible improve-
ments in the approach toward employer refusals to bargain.
(1) To give body to the vague criteria of "good faith" bargaining,
conduct should be examined not only in the light of the employer's total
course of action, 58 but in the specific context of the particular industry
"' Collective bargaining contracts add "dignity to the position of labor and
remove the feeling on the part of the worker that he is a mere pawn in industry
subject to the arbitrary power of the employer. [The contract becomes] the in-
dustrial constitution of the enterprise, setting forth the broad general principles
upon which the relationship of employer and employee is to be conducted." Parker,
J., in N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 110 F. 2d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 1940).
' 2 Weyand, The Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 45 COL. L. REV. 556
(1945).
"TAYLOR,, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 61 (1948);
Chamberlain, The Nature of the Bargaining Process, 11 U. OF Prrr. L. REV. 397,
406 (1950). See Barkin, The Technical Engineering Service of an American
Trade-Union, 61 INT'L. LAB. REv. 609 (1950).
"' MLLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 111, 121
and 448 (1950); Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REV. 389, 394 (1950.
"' See H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U. S. 514, 525 (1941) ; Timkin Roller
Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F. 2d 949, 953 (6th Cir. 1947).
" Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389 (1950) passim; Cox and Dunlop, The
Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing Agreement, 63
HARv. L. REV. 1097 (1950) passln.
"' The establishment of collective bargaining in steel, auto and rubber was not
peaceful. BRooxs, As STEEL GOES . . . , 130-152 (1940); LmNSON, LABOR ON
THE MARCH c. 7 and 201-209 (1938); ALINSKY, JOHN L. LEWIs c. 5, 6 and 7
(1949) ; MCKENNEY, INDUSTRIAL VALLEY 275 et seq. (1939). For developments
in textiles, see DEP'T LABOR BULL. No. 963, WORK STOPPAGES CAUSED BY LABOR-
MANAGEMENT DISPUTES IN 1948 17 (union organizational issues involved in 54
per cent of the man-days idle in the textile industry, compared with 17 per cent
for all manufacturing industries); ExECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 5TH BIENNIAL
CONVENTION TWUA-CIO 48 (1948); PROCEEDINGS 5TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION
TWUA-CIO 153 (1948) ; EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ROPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION
TWUA-CIO 37 (1950)." See footnote 20, supra.
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and particular area.59 Prevailing collective bargaining practices therein
might provide a helpful measuring rod.60
(2) In appraising the conduct of negotiations, the role of compro-
mise, so essential to the establishment of collective bargaining,61 should
be given greater emphasis. The legislative history of Section 8(d)
seems to indicate that it is no barrier to a continuing requirement of
counter-proposals in negotiations. 2  In N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery
Mills, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in finding a refusal
to bargain, compared concessions by the union and its willingness to
compromise with the uncompromising attitude of the employer. 3 While
the give-and-take of negotiations admit of no rigid yardstick, more con-
sideration might be given to comparing and evaluating the bargaining
attitudes of the two parties.
(3) The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit might well emulate
other circuits in cooperating with the N.L.R.B., to implement national
labor policy in the South. The labor philosophy expressed in the court's
dicta6 4 shows an underestimation of the values of collective bargaining.
The N.L.R.B. recently had occasion0 5 to ask the Supreme Court to
admonish the Fifth Circuit60 for its refusal to enforce certain N.L.R.B.
orders without giving any reason. Southern opposition to collective
" 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 86 (1936), quoting from M. H. Birge & Sons, Inc.,
1 N.L.R.B. 731, on the relevant factors in determining a refusal to bargain:
"... the labor relations background of the industry and the actions of the other
union manufacturers. . . ." See Russell Mfg. Co., Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 1081, 1098-
1101 and 1127 (1949) (use is made of the local sociological setting against which
employer conduct occurred); N.L.R.B. v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U. S. 226, 230
(1949) ("We cannot equate a company-dominated North Carolina mill town
with the vast metropolitan centers. .. ").
"0 See N.L.R.B. v. Knoxville Pub. Co., 124 F. 2d 875, 880 (6th Cir. 1942)
(prevailing economic conditions); N.L.R.B. v. Tower Hosiery Mills, 180 F. 2d
701, 704 (4th Cir. 1950) (employer's stringent proposal "was apparently previously
unheard of in this area"). See MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO
TAFT-HARLEY 117 (1950); Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining
by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 405 (1950).
"1 See Torff, The Taft-Hartley Act and Collective Bargaining: A Managenent
Appraisal, 43 ILL. L. REv. 323, 326 (1948).
6 2
See VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Acr, 1947 47; MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER AcT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 448
(1950). Contra: Adler Metal Products Corp., 79 N. L. R. B. 219 (1948) ; Den-
ham, The Taft-Hartley Act, 20 TENN. L. REv. 168, 179 (1948). But cf. Vanette
Hosiery Mills, 80 N.L.R.B. 1116, 1128 (1948), enforcement granted, 179 F. 2d 504
(1950).
63 180 F. 2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1950).
, N.L.R.B. v. Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 180 F. 2d 585, 586 (5th Cir.
1950) ; N.L.R.B. v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 167 F. 2d 212 (5th Cir. 1948) ; Stonewall
Cotton Mills, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 129 F. 2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U. S.
667 (1942) (opinion before re-hearing) ; N.L.R.B. v. Riverside Mfg. Co., 119 F.
2d 302, 304 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Globe Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94
(5th Cir. 1939).
61 N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari, pp. 11-23, N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta
Metallic Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949).
" See N.L.R.B. v. Mexia Textile Mills, Inc., 70 Sup. Ct. 826 (1950) ; N.L.R.B.
v. Pool Mfg. Co., 70 Sup. Ct. 830 (1950) (note dissenting opinion).
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bargaining may have been encouraged by the willingness of the Fifth
Circuit to set aside N.L.R.B. orders.0 7 Although that court has secured
compliance by using its contempt power to mediate, 8 it is possible that
a sympathetic approach toward the statutory obectives and a stiffening
of the contempt penalties might have a more constructive effect upon
the willingness of Southern textile employers to bargain collectively.
(4) The discretionary injunction power of the General Counsel 9
might be used to secure the compliance with national policy of especially
recalcitrant employers in the region. The speed of injunction could
help offset the deadly effects of long 'delays, often destructive of col-
lective bargaining, regardless of the final legal outcome.70
M. H. Ross.
Pleadings-General Allegation of Negligence-
Sufficiency Against Demurrer
There has been much confusion in the North Carolina courts con-
cerning the necessary requirements of complaints1 to withstand demurrer
for failure to state a cause of action2 in actions for negligence. In the
recent case of Davis v. Rhodes,3 an action for wrongful death, complaint
alleged "that defendant unlawfully, recklessly, and negligently struck
and collided" with the motor scooter on which the intestate was riding.
Defendant answered, denying negligence. Thereafter, plaintiff was
allowed to amend his complaint. This amendment, filed more than one
year after the death of the intestate, particularized the acts of negligence
relied upon. Defendant then demurred to the original complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and moved to dismiss the action as the
amendment was filed more than one year after the death of the intes-
tate.4 The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action;
7 N.L.R.B. petition for writ of certiorari, p. 13, N.L.R.B. v. Atlanta Metallic
Casket Co., 173 F. 2d 758 (5th Cir. 1949)." N.L.R.B. v. Corsicana Cotton Mills, 178 F. 2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949), 178 F.
2d 347 (5th Cir. 1949), 179 F. 2d 234 (5th Cir. 1950). Court allowed employer
to escape contempt penalty but kept case on docket and read transcripts of nego-
tiations, noting results of its mediation in later opinions.
81 61 STAT. 136, 29 U. S. C. §160j (Supp. 1947).
70 
MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 119 (1950);
EXECUTIVE COUNCIL REPORT 6TH BIENNIAL CONVENTION TWUA-CIQ 33 (1950)
(court rulings are often "hollow victories"). Se2 footnote 30, supra, for length
of delays.
' A complaint must contain a plain and concise statement of the facts consti-
tuting a cause of action. N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-122 (1943).
'Defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the face thereof
that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-127 (1943).
3 231 N. C. 71, 56 S. E. 2d 43 (1949).
4 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943) (... action . . . to be brought within one
year after such death). Where the original complaint does not state a cause of
action, an amendment, if it be good and available, would relegate the plaintiff to
19501
